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Abstract
We conducted a field experiment in a controlled work environ-
ment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its inter-
action with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk
significantly improves performance only when accompanied by per-
formance pay. Moreover, performance pay slightly reduces perfor-
mance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. These effects
also carry over to the quality of work. Performance pay alone leads
to more mistakes. Adding motivational talk makes the difference. In
treatments with performance pay, motivational talk increases out-
put by about 20 percent and reduces the ratio of mistakes by more
than 40 percent.
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1 Introduction
There is ample evidence that monetary incentives are not always benefi-
cial. In fact, monetary rewards, like bonuses or piece rates, can sometimes
induce worse performance. Psychologists refer to this as a “hidden cost
of reward:” performance pay crowds out the workers’ intrinsic motivation,
in particular by undermining workers’ confidence in their own abilities or
in the value of the rewarded task (Deci, 1975; Lepper and Greene, 1978).1
But intrinsic motivation is not only affected by monetary rewards. Firms
spend resources in order to facilitate and evoke the intrinsic motivation
of their workforce, for example by paying and developing managers and
leaders with motivational skills.2 So a central question is, will performance
pay undermine a leader’s effort in motivating her workers? Or could mon-
etary incentives instead complement and enhance the effect of a leader’s
motivational efforts?
Theory does not provide a clear answer to this. One conjecture is that,
when performance pay undermines intrinsic motivation, it will also under-
mine a leader’s attempt to evoke the workers’ intrinsic motivation. But
recent theoretical work shows that crowding out can be due to some infor-
mational asymmetries. If agents are uncertain about their own ability, the
value of the task, or the character of the principal, then material incen-
tives alone might create a negative signal that lowers the agents’ intrinsic
motivation (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson,
2008).3 An implication is that, if the information asymmetry is resolved,
performance pay improves performance rather than backfires. Related to
this, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) remark that the negative signal-
ing effect of material incentives might not extend to a situation where the
principal has multiple signals available. Our conjecture is that motiva-
1A seminal contribution is Deci (1971), who shows that some tasks may have own
inherent rewards, making external monetary rewards unnecessary or even detrimental to
effort. Using controlled laboratory and field experiments, economists have demonstrated
negative effects of monetary incentives in a variety of settings; see Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1997), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a,b), Bohnet et al. (2001), Fehr and Rockenbach
(2003), and Pokorny (2008). See also Gneezy and Rey-Biel (2011) for a nice review of
this literature.
2See, e.g., Sims (1998) on management training and leadership development.
3A compensation scheme may also signal a social norm, which the agent might prefer
to follow (Sliwka, 2007).
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tional efforts by a leader telling her employees how diligent they are and
how important their work is, can serve as such an extra signal, which poten-
tially changes the perception of performance pay. Similarly, performance
pay might change the perception of motivational efforts. For example, a
leader’s visionary speeches or motivational pep talks might be perceived
as more credible (and not just cheap talk) if he or she is willing to “put
money behind the words.”
In this paper, we present results from a field experiment designed to in-
vestigate the interaction between performance pay and motivational efforts.
We focus on “motivational talk,” words that potentially inspire workers
to exert extra effort. On behalf of a research group at the University of
Bonn, we hired students to enter data from ice hockey game reports into
a database. The students, who were unaware of their participation in an
experiment, were randomly assigned to one out of four treatments: with
or without performance pay and with or without motivational talk (moti-
vation, for short). In treatments with performance pay, subjects received
a small piece rate (10 euro cents) on top of a fixed payment (20 euro) for
each game report they were able to enter into the database. In treatments
with motivation, subjects were exposed to simple motivational sentences in
addition to a plain explanation of the task they were about to do.
We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only
when accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay re-
duces performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. This
also carries over to the quality of work. Performance pay alone leads to
more mistakes. Adding motivational talk, however, makes the difference.
Although subjects were not rewarded for quality, performance pay has a
positive effect on quality if it is accompanied by motivational talk. Hence,
we find what we can call a hidden benefit of monetary rewards: comple-
mentarity between performance pay and motivational talk. The effects are
strong. In treatments with performance pay, motivational talk increases
output by about 20 percent and reduces the ratio of mistakes by more than
40 percent.
Related literature: While economists have investigated motivation pri-
marily through the lens of monetary incentives, psychologists have been
more interested in the effect of non-monetary motivators such as recogni-
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tion, attention, and verbal feedback. An early lab experiment is Deci and
Ryan (1971) showing that provision of praise increases students’ willingness
to work on a puzzle. Cameron and Pierce (1994) provide a survey of the
subsequent lab-experimental literature. Stajkovic and Luthans (2003) give
an overview of experimental field studies on performance-dependent recog-
nition and report strong, positive effects in a variety of workplace contexts.
More recent papers include Grant and Gino (2010), who study experi-
mentally how a manager’s verbal expression of gratitude affects employees’
effort, and Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) and Bradler et al. (2013), who
use field experiments to investigate how social recognition affects employee
performance. All find substantial positive effects.4 Our paper differs from
this literature in two respects: First, we focus on non-contingent verbal
motivation prior to work instead of performance feedback and contingent
non-monetary rewards. Second, we are particularly interested in the inter-
action between verbal motivation and monetary incentives, which to our
knowledge has not been systematically investigated.5
While the formal literature on intrinsic motivation and crowding out
(cited above) provides some possible implications for the effect of non-
monetary motivation, there are only a few papers that explicitly address
the optimal interaction between non-monetary motivation and monetary
rewards. Marino and Zábojnik (2008) study the trade-off between work-
related perks and incentive provision, and Dur et al. (2010) analyze how
attention paid by the principal to the agent affects optimal incentive con-
tracting. Furthermore, Kvaløy and Schöttner (2013) analyze optimal in-
centive provision when a motivator can exert motivational effort to reduce
the effort costs of an agent. But none of these papers consider the direct,
negative effects of performance pay. In order to explicitly address the po-
tential signalling effect of both performance pay and motivational talk, we
4Related is also the experimental literature examining how feedback and communi-
cation can help resolve coordination problems. In particular, see Brandts and Cooper
(2007) who study how managers can use both monetary incentives and communication
in order to help employees coordinate on high effort-levels.
5In addition to the experimental literature, there is also a large body of literature
on organizational behavior that uses survey data in order to investigate employees’
motivation and experience with performance pay. Some report a positive relationship
between performance pay and intrinsic motivation. Babakus et al. (1996), Baldauf et al.
(2002), Miao and Evans (2007), and DelVecchio and Wagner (2011) all find that more
incentive pay leads to higher levels of intrinsic motivation among sales people.
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adopt a variant of Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) model on monetary
incentives and social preferences for our theoretical framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a model
on the interaction between motivational talk and monetary incentives. In
Section 3, we present the experimental design and procedure, while in Sec-
tion 4 we present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we present a simple principal-agent model with moral hazard
to analyze how performance pay and motivational talk of the principal
might affect the agent’s effort choice and consequently his performance. We
assume that the risk-neutral agent produces a verifiable output . Output
is a function of the agent’s non-observable effort  ≥ 0 and the realization
of a non-observable random variable . Specifically, we assume that  = 
with  ≥ 0 and [] = 1. The agent’s private effort costs are () = 2
2
. The
principal pays the agent a fixed wage  and a piece rate  ≥ 0 conditioned
on output . In addition, the principal can motivate the agent by exerting
motivational effort (in the form of motivational talk)  ≥ 0. Motivational
effort is costly to the principal, e.g., due to opportunity costs of time.
We assume that the principal is better informed about the production
environment than the agent. As a result, the principal’s choice of mone-
tary incentives and motivational effort constitutes a signal that allows the
agent to better assess the circumstances of production. For example, per-
formance pay might affect the agent’s assessment of the task difficulty or
his task-specific ability (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) or of the principal’s
character and whether she is worth impressing (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006;
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). Similarly, motivational talk can influ-
ence the agent’s perception of the task, his ability, or the principal’s type.
For example, if a principal takes the time to engage in motivational talk,
this might signal that the work is important or that she has social prefer-
ences or cares about the agent. In theory, however, motivational talk could
also indicate that the task is likely to be unattractive, because the principal
sees the need for some extra motivation.
To account for the potential signalling aspects of performance pay and
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motivation, we consider a variant of the state-dependent utility function
proposed by Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012). Because these authors focus
on monetary incentives, we extend their utility function to allow for a
potential impact of motivational talk. We thus assume that the agent’s
expected utility is
+ [|]− () + (0 +  + + ) (1)
with the parameters 0 ≥ 0 and    ∈ R. The parameter 0 mea-
sures the agent’s baseline intrinsic motivation, i.e., his marginal utility from
exerting effort in the absence of motivation and performance pay. The re-
maining parameters reflect potential crowding effects of the piece rate 
and the motivational effort , respectively, due to the signal content of
these instruments.6 When the principal employs either performance pay
or motivational talk only, the crowding effects are described by the para-
meters  and , respectively. When performance pay and motivation are
used simultaneously, however, the signal content of either instrument might
change, so that the crowding effects are non-separable in performance pay
and motivation. This is the case if  is different from zero.
The timing is as follows: The principal first announces the compensation
scheme ( ). Afterwards, she exerts motivational effort . The agent
observes  and exerts effort . Finally,  is realized and the principal
pays the agent. Now consider the stage where the agent chooses effort to
maximize his expected utility (1). The optimal effort choice ∗( ) thus is
∗ =  + 0 +  + + . (2)
From (2), we can derive the agent’s incentive responsiveness ∗ and his
“motivation responsiveness” ∗,
∗ = 1 +  +  and ∗ =  + . (3)
By (2), if 0  0, the agent exerts effort even if the principal employs
6Variations in the fixed payment  might also provide a signal on the production
environment. However, we abstract from this possibility because the fixed payment is
identical in all treatments of our experiment.
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neither performance pay nor motivational talk ( =  = 0). Now assume
that the principal introduces a piece rate in addition to the fixed wage
(  0 and  = 0). By (3), the agent might respond by an effort increase
(∗  0) or a weak decrease in effort (∗ ≤ 0). In the former case, the piece
rate either constitutes a favorable signal on the production environment
and thus crowds in the agent’s effort (  0), or the piece rate is an
unfavorable signal that crowds out effort, but this effect does not dominate
the marginal utility from a larger expected monetary payoff (0    −1).
In contrast, the agent weakly reduces his effort under the piece rate if the
crowding out effect is sufficiently strong ( ≤ −1). If the principal engages
in motivational talk in addition to the fixed wage ( = 0 and   0),
the agent increases his effort if and only if   0, i.e., motivational talk
provides a favorable signal on the production environment.
We are particularly interested in the interaction between performance
pay and motivational talk. From (3), we obtain that the two instruments
can be substitutes (∗ =   0) as well as complements (∗ =  
0). First, consider the case ∗  0. It implies that, if motivational talk
crowds in effort (  0), incentives will make motivational talk less fruitful.
For example, motivational talk alone might be a favorable signal on the
principal’s characteristics, which is, however, counteracted by a piece rate.
If, on the other hand, motivational talk provides a signal that crowds out
effort (  0), this signal will be amplified by performance pay. For
instance, the agent might assume that the principal exerts motivational
effort to talk him into an unpleasant job. In both situations, the interaction
of performance pay and motivational talk is detrimental to effort, which
can be interpreted as a “hidden cost of reward.”
In the more interesting case   0, a piece rate enhances the effec-
tiveness (or reduces the defectiveness) of motivational talk, which can be
termed “hidden benefit of reward.” For example, without performance pay,
motivational talk might not be credible and thus only be seen as cheap talk,
while performance pay shows that the principal is willing to “put money be-
hind the words.” Moreover,   0 could also mean that motivational talk
counteracts a potentially unfavorable signal of performance pay (  0).
The principal might even be able to use motivational talk to resolve the
problem of asymmetric information on the production environment, that
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is responsible for the crowding out effect of performance pay. The latter is
then completely eliminated by motivational talk (i.e.,  +  = 0).
Our rather general theoretical framework can tell us something about
potential interaction effects between motivational talk and performance
pay, but it cannot provide us with any obvious hypothesis in this respect.
We will thus investigate the sign of  empirically without stating any
formal hypothesis.
3 Experimental design and procedure
3.1 General description
We conducted a field experiment to study the interaction between perfor-
mance pay and motivational talk. On behalf of a research group at the
University of Bonn, we hired students to enter data from official game
reports of the German ice hockey league into a database (Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet). This database needed to be extended for an ongoing research
project. The task was rather simple, but it also required a certain degree
of care and attention from the subjects.7
The subjects were not aware of their involvement in an experiment.
We recruited them by using a written announcement, which we advertised
on the university’s job market website and the electronic newsletters of
different faculties. Additionally, we distributed flyers in the university’s two
main cafeterias for two weeks in a row. The announcement advertised a one-
time job opportunity for entering data for two hours. The compensation
was stated as approximately 10 euro per hour, which is slightly higher than
the hourly wage of a student assistant.
Altogether 203 students applied. The students were randomly assigned
to the treatments, taking into account that a few of them stated time
restrictions in their application. We invited them via e-mail and asked
them to confirm their appointment. Moreover, we sent a reminder two
days before a session, with the date and time of their appointment. The
7Similar data entry tasks are frequently used in field experiments because they allow
measurement of performance and quality without frequently monitoring the subjects
(see, e.g., Henning-Schmidt et al., 2010; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; and Kube
et al., 2012). Monitoring might interfere with incentives from performance pay.
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experiment was conducted on four days in November and December 2012
at the University of Bonn. We executed two sessions for each of our four
treatments with 17 to 20 subjects each (some subjects failed to show up for
work), yielding a total of 139 observations for our analysis (46 males and
93 females).8
To establish a work environment that was as natural as possible, the
sessions were not conducted in the BonnEconLab but in a computer pool
at the University of Bonn. Upon arrival, each subject was randomly placed
in front of a computer terminal. On the desk next to the computer was a
box containing printed, official game reports from the German ice hockey
league. Each subject at a certain terminal, e.g., terminal 1, had to enter the
same data as the subjects of other sessions sitting at the same terminal, i.e.,
the data entered was identical for each terminal, but different between the
terminals of one session. Hence, the difficulty of the data entering process
was the same in all sessions. The subjects were able to see each other.
However, because the printed reports were stored in a box and the finished
ones had to be put in another box next to them, they could not observe how
many reports the other subjects entered. The task was explained by the
experimenter at the beginning of each session. The experimenter followed
a detailed protocol and read the explanations aloud, instead of reciting
them from memory, to ensure that the wording was exactly the same in
each session. She also presented powerpoint slides with screenshots of the
spreadsheet to demonstrate which data had to be entered in a certain cell.
This procedure took about 15 minutes. To rule out a possible influence
on the subjects’ behavior, the experimenter did not change her physical
appearance (clothes, hair, etc.) from one session to the next.
The subjects had the opportunity to ask clarifying questions before
the working period started. In all sessions some subjects asked how to
adjust the zoom, the width of a cell, and how they could scroll through the
document. They also asked how they could store the spreadsheet to save
the results from time to time. After answering all questions in plenary, the
experimenter left the room. We chose to leave the subjects alone during the
90-minute working period to rule out possible effects of monitoring. The
8143 students participated in the experiment. Due to hardware failure, however, the
data was not stored completely for 4 participants.
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subjects were informed that the experimenter would be available next door
for questions. The subjects knew that the experimenter would interrupt
them after 45 minutes and ask them to upload the data to a central storage
to avoid data loss.
3.2 Treatments
We employed a 2×2 design: with or without performance pay and with or
without motivational talk, as illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Overview treatments
Fixed payment Performance payment
Neutral talk fixed treatment pfp treatment
Motivational talk fixed-moti treatment pfp-moti treatment
In the two treatments with motivational talk (called fixed-moti and pfp-
moti) subjects were exposed to simple motivational sentences in addition
to a plain explanation of the task they were about to do. Except for
these sentences, the instructions for all treatments were identical.9 The
motivational sentences were as follows:
Beginning of instructions: Welcome to the CIP Pool of the Juridicum.
I am glad that you decided to assist us by recording the data for a research
project. In the framework of a large research project, we analyze sports data,
in this case ice hockey, to investigate the behavior of teams and competitive
situations. We are certain that you, as competent students of the University
of Bonn, are able to record the data quickly and precisely.
End of instructions: I know that the work might be exhausting and tiring,
but I also know that you are diligent students who are able to concentrate
on these kinds of tasks for longer periods. If you decide to leave the room,
please try to be quiet to avoid disturbing your colleagues. You are welcome
to adjust the screen to your convenience or to alter the zoom in the excel
9Complete instructions translated into English can be found in the appendix.
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sheet. If there are no more questions, let´s start working! In addition,
when the subjects were interrupted to upload the data after 45 minutes,
they were told: Keep up the good work!
These are moderate motivational sentences, representing key aspects
of motivational leadership (see, e.g., Robbins and Judge (2013), for an
overview). The “leader”—represented by the experimenter—expresses pur-
pose and meaning, positive expectations, and sensitivity to the workers’
needs.10 Subjects might deduce from these words that they are participat-
ing in a valuable project and are likely to do a good job, which will be
to the benefit of a (likable) employer. In contrast, the neutral talk says
nothing about the purpose of the work or the employer’s expectations.
In treatments with performance pay (called pfp and pfp-moti), subjects
received a small piece rate (10 euro cents) on top of the fixed payment (20
euro) for each game report they entered into the spreadsheet. This com-
pensation scheme resulted in performance pay of approximately 10 percent
on top of fixed pay, which is quite common in practice. We informed the
subjects at the end of the instructions about their payment.
While we did not control for the quality of the entered data, we did,
however, check the number of entered game reports at the end of the work-
ing period to determine the payment in the performance-pay treatments.
We conducted the fixed-payment sessions before the performance-pay ses-
sions to avoid the expectations of being paid by performance. On average,
subjects earned 2106 euro (20 euro in the treatments with fixed pay and
2217 euro in the treatments with pay for performance).
4 Results
Our key performance variable is the number of entered games in the spread-
sheet (i.e., quantity).11 In a second step, we also analyze the effects on the
10With respect to the latter, we did not want motivational talk to make the task easier
by improving the subjects’ technological competence. Hence, information about screen
and zoom adjustments were made available in each treatment. However, it was made up
front in the motivational-talk treatments (showing sensitivity to workers’ needs), while
the information in the neutral-talk treatment was given either as a response to or after
practical questions by subjects (in plenary) before they started working.
11To take into account that the number of filled cells varied between the games, we also
used the number of filled cells as a robustness check. The results remain qualitatively
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Figure 1: Average performance over treatments
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quality of the work.
The bar chart in Figure 1 shows the average performance in the four
treatments, as well as the 95 percent confidence intervals. The subjects
entered more games in the fixed-moti (mean 2208) than in the fixed treat-
ment (mean 2097), but this difference is not statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney U test,  = 0377).12 However, adding motivation to pay for
performance increases performance significantly (Mann-Whitney U test,
 = 0004). The mean performance is 1966 in the pfp-treatment and 2347
in the pfp-moti treatment.
This indicates that performance pay and motivational talk complement
each other. But, in order to investigate whether performance pay enhances
the effect of motivational talk (and vice versa), one has to study the in-
teraction between the variables. We thus estimate a linear regression with
an interaction term. Motivational talk  and performance pay  are the
independent variables (main effects), and the number of entered games 
the same and can be obtained from the authors upon request.
12All Mann-Whitney U tests are two-sided.
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is the dependent variable:
 = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + controls+ 
Here,  = 1 if subject  was exposed to motivational talk (i.e., partici-
pated in fixed-moti or pfp-moti treatment), while  = 1 if subject  received
performance pay (i.e., participated in pfp or pfp-moti treatment). Hence,
1 shows the effect of motivation without performance pay, 2 shows the
effect of performance pay without motivation, while 3 estimates the in-
teraction between motivation and performance pay. We added additional
control variables (gender, age, a dummy indicating if the subject is en-
rolled in economics, and session time13) and calculated robust standard
errors clustered on sessions.14
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2.15 Column (1)
shows the results for overall performance. We first see that motivational
talk alone has no significant effect on overall performance. Moreover, per-
formance pay alone actually has a significantly negative effect on perfor-
mance when it is not accompanied by motivational talk. However, the
experiment identifies what can be termed a “hidden benefit of reward:”
The interaction coefficient  = 3 is positive and significantly different
from zero, i.e., motivational talk and performance pay are complements.
This implies that performance pay makes motivational talk more efficient
and that motivational talk improves the effect of performance pay. In the
appendix we also present regressions on treatment effects, showing that
subjects in the pfp-moti treatment perform significantly better than sub-
jects in any of the other three treatments (Table A1).
Next, we analyze the performance during the first 45 minutes of the
working period (first half) and the performance during the second 45minutes
13Each treatment had one morning session and one afternoon session.
14We checked whether the observable characteristics of the participants such as gender,
age, and course of study are balanced across treatments with Pearson Chi Square and
Kruskal Wallis tests. Overall, the characteristics are well balanced, with the exception
of participants who are enrolled in economics. They participated more often in the
fixed-moti than in the other treatments.
15Note that the results remain qualitatively the same if we take into account that
our dependent variable consists of non-negative integers and resembles count data and
estimate negative binomial regressions instead of OLS. The results can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
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(second half) separately. This enables us to see whether the behavior of
the subjects changed over the course of the working period. Recall that the
subjects were interrupted after 45 minutes and told to store the data. In
the two motivational-talk treatments, the experimenter added the phrase
“Keep up the good work” to all subjects in plenary before leaving the room.
Table 2: Effects of motivation and piece rate on performance
Overall First half Second half
Motivation 0763 0667∗∗ 0096
(0688) (0227) (0643)
Piece rate −1508∗∗ −0295 −1213∗∗
(0568) (0242) (0347)
Motivation x piece rate 3462∗∗ 0762∗ 2700∗∗
(0992) (0373) (0839)
Female −2310∗ −1447∗∗ −0863
(1156) (0587) (0599)
Age −0373∗ −0197∗ −0175
(0186) (0085) (0106)
Enrolled in economics −0505 −0459 −0046
(1064) (0526) (0641)
Morning session 0772 0364 0409
(0632) (0220) (0500)
Constant 3097∗∗∗ 1400∗∗∗ 1697∗∗∗
(3685) (1628) (2219)
Observations 139 139 139
2 0131 0135 0125
Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors clustered
on sessions are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is performance, measured
by the number of reported games. “Motivation” is a dummy variable indicating that
subjects were exposed to motivational talk. “Piece rate” is a dummy variable indicating
subjects earned an additional piece rate. “Motivation x piece rate” is the interaction of
both aforementioned dummy variables. We added dummy variables for females, subjects
studying economics, and sessions executed in the morning, as well as a control for age.
∗∗∗p 0.01, ∗∗p 0.05, ∗p 0.1
Figure 2 depicts the performance for the first and second half of the
working period. In all treatments, performance is significantly higher in
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Figure 2: Average performance during first and second half of the working
period
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the second half of the working period, which indicates learning effects that
are quite common in such tasks (Wilcoxon signed rank test,  = 0000 for
all treatments).
From the regression in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2, we see that both
performance pay and motivational talk alone have weaker motivational
effects in the second half than in the first half. Motivational talk alone
(without pfp) has a significantly positive effect in the first half, but it
disappears in the second half. Performance pay alone does not have a
negative effect in the first half, but it becomes significantly negative in the
second half. However, the interaction coefficient is positive and significant
in both halves, but considerably stronger in the second half. Hence, there
is a “hidden benefit of reward” during the whole working period, but it
becomes stronger in the second half.
Finally, we investigate how performance pay andmotivational talk affect
the quality of work. Figure 3 shows the ratio of mistakes (incorrect cell
entries) to the number of filled cells for each treatment.16 From the bar
16We analyze the ratio of mistakes to the number of filled cells to control for the
differences in performance between the treatments, but the results are qualitatively
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Figure 3: Average ratio of mistakes to number of filled cells
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chart in Figure 3 we see that the means are lower when the subjects are
exposed to motivational talk. Hence, performance pay alone not only leads
to lower performance but also to more mistakes per entered cell. Yet the
difference is not significant ( = 0169), and the regression in column (1) of
Table A2 does not show significant effects for the motivation and piece-rate
dummies as well as their interaction (p-value for the interaction effect is
0142).
However, when comparing the pfp with the pfp-moti treatment, we ob-
serve a significantly lower ratio of mistakes to the number of filled cells
in the pfp-moti treatment (F-test for 1 + 3 = 0  = 0015), indicat-
ing that indeed adding motivational talk to pay for performance makes
the difference.17 The average ratio of mistakes to number of filled cells
is 00383 in the pfp treatment, while the ratio is 00215 in the pfp-moti
treatment. Hence, adding motivational talk to performance pay leads to
a reduction of the mistakes ratio by more than 40 percent. Furthermore,
we find significant differences when comparing the fixed-moti with the pfp-
similar if we simply look at mistakes.
17The results for regressions with treatment dummies and pfp-moti treatment as the
reference category are reported in column (2) of Table A2 in the appendix.
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moti treatment (F-Test for 2 + 3 = 0  = 0036). Hence, although
subjects are not rewarded for quality, performance pay has a significantly
positive effect on quality if it is accompanied by motivational talk.
Finally, it should be noted that there are huge differences in the vari-
ances in the mistakes ratio between treatments. To the extent that variance
is of interest here, one could argue that for a given average in the ratio of
mistakes, low variance is better than high variance for the overall data qual-
ity that the hockey game researchers needed. We find that the variance is
highest in the pfp treatment, while it is lowest in the pfp-moti treatment.
The variance is in fact thirty times higher in pfp than in pfp-moti (robust
test for equality of variances p=0.04).
5 Concluding remarks
Despite warnings from a number of bestselling business books about the
hidden costs of monetary rewards,18 performance pay is increasingly popu-
lar (Lemieux et al., 2009). This might indicate that there exist some hidden
benefits of reward, i.e., that monetary incentives interact positively with
other motivational tools. In this paper, we present a field experiment de-
signed to investigate the interaction between monetary incentives and a
primal form of motivation, namely motivational talk - words that poten-
tially evoke the workers’ intrinsic motivation and inspire them to exert
extra effort. We identify what can be termed a hidden benefit of reward:
Subjects respond to motivational talk by increasing their performance only
if they also receive performance pay. Moreover, performance pay decreases
performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. Consequently,
performance pay and motivational talk are complements in enhancing per-
formance. The advantageous combination of performance pay and motiva-
tion also carries over to the quality of work. Although subjects were not
rewarded for quality, performance pay has a positive effect on quality only
if it is accompanied by motivational talk. The effects are strong. In treat-
ments with performance pay, motivational talk increases output by about
20 percent and reduces the ratio of mistakes by more than 40 percent.
18See, e.g., Nelson (2005) and Pink (2009).
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The negative effects of performance pay alone deserve a remark. Al-
though the crowding out effects from monetary incentives are documented
in a variety of settings, it is hard to find field evidence on negative effects
of piece rates, like we do here. A reason might be that some simple forms
of motivational talk are always present in the field, and hence performance
pay always interacts with other motivational instruments. In the lab, how-
ever, neutral talk or neutral instructions are more common. Our neutral
talk does not signal any inherent value of the task nor any prosocial pref-
erences from the principal, and creates an environment in which a small
piece rate can have the negative effects that are described in the prominent
models of Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008). But once the principal signals task value or prosociality through
motivational talk, we see that the piece rate improves performance rather
than backfires. In this respect, our experimental results support the above-
mentioned theories, and could also inspire a more elaborate version of the
multisignal model we propose in the theory section.
Our paper identifies an interaction between monetary incentives and
communication. To the extent economists have been interested in commu-
nication, it has mainly been related to coordination problems and not to
incentives and motivation. But communication is a complex and important
variable, with the potential for building bridges between economics and the
broader literature on leadership and organizational behavior. More research
is needed in order to investigate how different forms of communication in-
teract with different sets of incentive schemes.
Still, the simple experiment presented in this paper has important im-
plications for company practises: First, we show that communication might
be crucial to preventing monetary rewards from backfiring. Second, small
piece rates, constituting only 10 percent of the total salary, can be rather
effective when they are accompanied by simple forms of motivational talk.
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6 Appendix
Table A1: Treatment effects on performance
Overall First half Second half
Fixed treatment −2716∗∗∗ −1133∗∗∗ −1583∗∗
(0702) (0288) (0549)
Fixed-moti treatment −1954∗ −0466∗ −1487∗
(0827) (0218) (0783)
Pfp treatment −4225∗∗∗ −1429∗∗∗ −2796∗∗∗
(0539) (0274) (0442)
Female −2310∗ −1447∗∗ −0863
(1156) (0587) (0599)
Age −0373∗ −0197∗ −0175
(0186) (0085) (0106)
Enrolled in economics −0505 −0459 −0046
(1064) (0526) (0641)
Morning session 0772 0364 0409
(0632) (0220) (0500)
Constant 3368∗∗∗ 1513∗∗∗ 1855∗∗∗
(4078) (1789) (2438)
Observations 139 139 139
2 0131 0135 0125
Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors clustered
on sessions are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is performance, measured
by the number of reported games. We added dummy variables for each treatment,
with the pfp-moti treatment as the reference category. We added dummy variables for
females, subjects studying economics, and sessions executed in the morning, as well as
a control for age. ∗∗∗p 0.01, ∗∗p 0.05, ∗p 0.1
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Table A2: Effects of motivation and piece rate as well as treatment effects
on mistakes
(1) (2)
Motivation −0002
(0007)
Piece rate 0010
(0009)
Motivation x piece rate −0014
(0008)
Fixed treatment 0007
(0008)
Fixed-moti treatment 0005∗∗
(0002)
Pfp treatment 0016∗∗
(0005)
Female 0003 0003
(0002) (0002)
Age −0001 −0001
(0001) (0001)
Enrolled in economics −0004 −0004
(0005) (0005)
Morning session 0009 0009
(0006) (0006)
Constant 0052∗ 0052∗
(0022) (0022)
Observations 139 139
2 0064 0064
Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors clustered
on sessions are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is the ratio of mistakes to
number of filled cells. “Motivation” is a dummy variable indicating that subjects were
exposed to motivational talk. “Piece rate” is a dummy variable indicating that subjects
earned an additional piece rate. “Motivation x piece rate” is the interaction of both
aforementioned dummy variables. In the second column, we added dummy variables
for each treatment with the pfp-moti treatment as the reference category. We added
dummy variables for females, subjects studying economics, and sessions executed in the
morning, as well as a control for age. ∗∗∗p 0.01, ∗∗p 0.05, ∗p 0.1
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Instructions
The motivational sentences, which were only used in the motivational
treatments, are in bold letters.
Dear students,
Welcome to the CIP Pool of the Juridicum. I am glad that
you decided to assist us by recording the data for a research
project. In the framework of a large research project, we analyze
sports data, in this case ice hockey, to investigate the behavior
of teams and competitive situations. We are certain that you, as
competent students of the University of Bonn, are able to record
the data quickly and precisely. My name is XX, and I will explain
your task. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
During the next 90 minutes, you are supposed to enter data in an Excel
sheet. The Excel sheet is located on a USB flash drive plugged into your
computer, and we have already opened it. Please save your work regularly
to avoid the loss of data. Please make sure that you do not log out, because
all data not stored on the flash drive will be erased. Save your data on the
flash drive after the 90 minutes.
To your left, you find a box with game reports from the German ice
hockey league. A report can consist of several sheets of paper that are
stapled together. Each report has a unique identification number. We
will now use an example to show you how the data should be recorded.
You find the example game report on the top of the box on your left.
Start by entering the ID of the game. You find the ID in the upper-left
corner on the first page of the game record. Here, it is 1112_358. The
date has to be entered in the second column; here, it is 11032012. You
find the date here (showing the date on the screenshot in the powerpoint
presentation). Enter the name of the home team into the next column. You
find it on the first page denoted as the first team, in this case “Eisbaeren
Berlin.” Then you enter the visiting team, in this case “Koelner Haie.”
The number of spectators has to be entered into the next column, and you
find this number at the end of the game report in the section “Additional
information.” Please note that the comma indicates a thousand; hence, we
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have 14 200 spectators. Next you enter the duration of the game, which
you can also find in the section “Additional information.” Here, you have
to enter 02 : 25. Please be careful to enter the duration in the correct
format.
Next we have the entries for the number of shot goals for each third.
You will find the necessary information in the section “Results” on the
first page. Please enter the number of shot goals for the home and visiting
teams separately. If the game is tied at the end of the regular time, there
will be a so-called overtime. This would be indicated by “OT” in the game
report. If there is information available for an overtime, please enter it
in the respective columns. In this example, this would be zero for both
teams. If a game is still tied after the overtime, there will be a penalty
shooting. This would be indicated by “SO” in the game report and would
have to be entered in the columns O and P, as in this example. On the
right side of the number of shot goals, you find information regarding shots
at goal, which has to be entered next. Again, this information has to be
entered for each third and for each team separately. Again, there might
be information regarding an overtime or penalty shooting. Next you have
to enter the goalie statistics, which you can find on the second page of the
game report. Please start with the name of the first goalie of the home
team, in this case R. Zepp. His name can be found on the left in the first
column. Then you have to enter in the column denoted “MIN” the number
of minutes the goalie has been in play. Enter the number of shots at goal
and saves into the next columns. If the goalie was changed in a game, the
information regarding the second goalie has to be entered in the columns
denoted with “Torhueter 2.” This is not the case in this example. The same
is true for the goalie of the visiting team.
Now we look at the penalties. Here you will have to do some math.
There are different kinds of penalties in hockey, and their respective du-
rations depend on the severity of the violation. You find the necessary
information on the first page in the section “Penalties.” Please start by
counting the number of 2-minute penalties of the home team in the first
third and then enter the number in column AQ. Here, we have one 2-
minute penalty. Please enter the number of the penalties and not the
minutes; hence, if there was one 2-minute penalty, you have to enter a “1”
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and not a “2.” Next count the number of 5-minute penalties of the home
team in the first third and enter it in column AR. We also have 10-minute
penalties and 20-minute penalties. For each of those penalties, we have
two columns; 10 and 10 and 20 and 20. The automatic 10-minute
penalties, which are always called together with a 2-minute penalty, have
to be entered in the column 10. You can recognize automatic 10-minute
penalties because the same player receives an identical penalty of 2 minutes
at the exact same time. This is the case in the example game report. 10
penalties are 10-minute penalties that are ruled without an accompanying
2-minute penalty at the same time. Here, you see an example from another
game report (shown in the Powerpoint slides). The same logic applies for
the 20-minute penalties. Here, you enter the penalty in the column 20 if
it was ruled together with a 5-minute penalty. 20 contains all penalties
ruled without an accompanying 5-minute penalty. In the column “MP,”
you enter match penalties with a duration of 25 minutes. Please count the
penalties for each team and each third separately and enter the number in
the respective column. On your desk you will find a sheet with additional
explanations regarding the penalties.
Now we come to the power plays which you can find on the first page
of the game report. Enter the first number in the column “goals,” here
zero, and the second in the column “power,” here 5. Next we have the
information about the referees and linesmen, which you find at the end of
the game report.
When you have finished a game report, please put the corresponding
sheets of paper into the box to your right and save the data. Please do not
change the order of the game reports. After 45 minutes, I will return and
ask you to store the data in an extra file. At that time I will explain to
you how exactly this works.
During the next 45 minutes, you will work independently. If you have
questions, you can come to the next room and ask me. Of course, you are
allowed to leave the room to visit the women’s or men’s room. After 90
minutes, you will receive your payment of 20 euro in the room next door
after you hand in the stick. (In pfp treatments, the following was added:
Additionally, we will pay you 10 euro cents for each game you entered. To
determine the correct payment we will briefly check the number of games
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you have entered before we pay you.)
I know that the work might be exhausting and tiring, but I
also know that you are diligent students who are able to concen-
trate on these kinds of tasks for longer periods. If you decide to
leave the room, please try to be quiet to avoid disturbing your
colleagues. You are welcome to adjust the screen to your conve-
nience or to alter the zoom in the excel sheet. If there are no
more questions, let´s start working!
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